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NOWHERE TO HIDE: ENDING ANONYMITY
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
Rachel Berman-Vaporis*
The current legal framework for combating human trafficking for
sexual exploitation is reviewed noting its strengths and weaknesses. Next,
the Palermo Protocol is evaluated to determine which legal weaknesses are
now adequately addressed and which continue to be a problem. A strategy
is then suggested to overcome the remaining loopholes in the legal fight to
end human trafficking for sexual exploitation. This strategy involves the
development of a database of those who have been convicted of human
trafficking for sexual exploitation and related crimes in an effort to unify
the definition of human trafficking, serve as a tool for prosecuting human
trafficking, and increase the amount of case law available on human
trafficking crimes. The obstacles for combating human trafficking for
sexual exploitation are compared to those for combating sex crimes in
domestic legislation. The positive effect of having a database similar to a
sex offender registry is discussed and the potential negative consequences
that could result from such a database are considered. Conclusions are
drawn recommending the development of such database, as it will make the
implementation of the Palermo Protocol and the prosecution of human
traffickers, transparent to the international community. It will also act as a
deterrent to those who participate in human trafficking for sexual
exploitation.

INTRODUCTION
A nineteen-year old girl thought her stars had aligned when a woman
approached her at the bus station. This woman offered her an opportunity
to join her husband and get a job in the United States. She promised to help
her. After days of cooking and cleaning for the woman to “earn her
transportation to the United States,” her benefactress turned her over to
three men who beat her, drugged her, and sold her for sex.1 For three
months, she was locked in a small room as both men and women paid to
rape and torture her. Her nightmare continued until American immigration
officials discovered her in the trunk of her captor’s car at the U.S.-Mexico
border. But she had to spend six months in a detention center and endure

1.

Diary of a Trafficking Victim, THE VICTIM’S INFORMER, 1, 10 (June/July 2011),
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Victims_Informer_Vol_16_02.pdf
(anonymous trafficking victim describing her experiences in sexual slavery).
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consultations with multiple attorneys before she was “officially” identified
as a trafficking victim.2
This is testimony from a trafficking victim who survived. But what
happened to the men and women who tortured and raped her in Mexico?
Or her captors who continually drugged and beat her? What happened to
the woman who fraudulently promised to help her obtain employment but
instead sold her into sexual slavery?
Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is on the rise all over the
globe.3 All too often, victims are ignored by authorities or fall through the
cracks of a society whose priorities are elsewhere. Perhaps even more
appalling is the fact that the people responsible for these heinous crimes
often suffer little or no penalty. Instead, lower-level criminals present when
police raid a trafficking ring receive a slap on the wrist, and all other
individuals involved in the criminal enterprise suffer little if any penalty.
All they lose are a few slaves that are easy to replace or re-apprehend.
The human trafficking problem has not gone unnoticed. The United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”)
and one of the accompanying protocols, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (“the
Supplementary Protocol”),4 have tried to foster international cooperation to
end this cycle.5 There has been little success to date due to the vague
language found in both treaties and the lack of a specific tool to come out
of these agreements to unify both the definition and prosecution of
trafficking. Without such as tool, enforcement of human trafficking has
been patchwork at best as national governments fruitlessly try to stem the
flow of a crime that, because of its international character, requires
international action.
This Note will focus on human trafficking for sexual exploitation
(“HTSE”). The current legal and enforcement framework to combat HTSE
is deficient in a number of ways. These deficiencies allow HTSE to
flourish because countries are secretly able to renege on their treaty
2.

Id. (anonymous trafficking victim describing her experiences in sexual slavery).

3.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 45 (2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm (finding that “the ILO
identified a higher percentage of sex trafficking victims than in the 2005
Report”); see also LOUISE SHELLEY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (2010) (discussing various forms of human trafficking and
comparing human trafficking in various countries).

4.

Both of these documents will be referred to individually as well as jointly in this
Note. When the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime is
referred to individually, it will be referred to as UNTOC. When the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children is referred to individually, it will be referred to as ”the Supplementary
Protocol.” When they are both referred to at the same time, the two documents
together will be referred to as “the Palermo Protocol.”

5.

See generally United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
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obligations. To unify the definition of HTSE, aid in the enforcement of
treaty obligations, and diminish the prevalence of HTSE by exposing all of
those who support this crime, countries must adopt the Offenders of
Humanity Database. The new tool proposed by this Note will allow
individuals, NGOs, and governments to track the implementation of HTSE
treaty obligations.
This Note does not in any way include those involved in legal
prostitution. While there are arguments as to whether prostitution is
inherently exploitive, this Note focuses on the parts of the sex industry that
are illegal.
Part I of this Note will define and discuss the current status of HTSE.
Part II will discuss the current international legal framework concerning
HTSE and its deficiencies. Part III will provide a specific solution to
address these deficiencies in the form of the Offenders of Humanity
Database.

I.
A.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

The Current Status of Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation

Simply, human trafficking is slavery.6 Some of the earliest information
on slavery comes from the Code of Hammurabi in the eighteenth century
B.C. and from sources from the seventh century B.C. on the role of slaves
in Greek society.7 Human trafficking is the modern manifestation of
slavery.8 HTSE first rose to prominence as an international issue in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9 At that time, the problem was
commonly known as “white slavery” and focused “primarily . . . on
trafficking in women for ‘immoral purposes’ or prostitution.”10 Early
treaties on this subject “emphasized the coordination of information among
state parties and discussed steps to repatriate the victims.”11
6.

Quick Facts About Human Trafficking, END HUMAN TRAFFICKING NOW (last
visited November 8, 2013), http://www.endhumantraffickingnow.com/quickfacts-about-human-trafficking/ (stating that human trafficking is “a contemporary
form of slavery”).

7.

Bamber
Gascoigne,
History
of
Slavery,
SLAVERY
WORLD,
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ac41 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2013) (tracing the history of slavery from its earliest known
historical sources).

8.

Enrique A. Maciel-Matos, Comment, Beyond the Shackles and Chains of the
Middle Passage: Human Trafficking Unveiled, 12 SCHOLAR 327, 328 (2010)
(discussing how human trafficking constitutes “the largest manifestation of
slavery” today).

9.

Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to
Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2004) (stating that “[h]uman
trafficking has risen to prominence . . . in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.”).

10.

Id.

11.

Id. at 8.
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This issue reemerged into international concern during “the growing
global movement for women’s rights” in the 1970s.12 Currently, it is
estimated that about 20.9 million persons are trafficked a year, and of
these, over 4.5 million are trafficked for sexual exploitation.13 Despite the
estimated 20.9 million trafficking victims, only 41,210 were identified as
such in 2011.14 Trafficking can occur domestically, within a State, or across
international borders.15 While the human trafficking operation takes many
forms,16 often traffickers use force or lure their victims with false promises
in order to obtain control over their victims and shuttle them across
borders.17 Although men and boys are trafficking victims, the majority of
victims are women and girls.18 In fact, 98% of individuals trafficked for
sexual exploitation are female.19 While the business model for human
trafficking can range anywhere from the small-scale entrepreneur model to
global organized crime networks, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
(“UNODC”) estimates that yearly profits from all aspects of human
trafficking reach upwards of $31.6 billion.20 Profits for individual human
traffickers vary, with sophisticated cartels “fetching $400,000 a head for

12.

Id. at 10.

13.

ILO 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour Executive Summary,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR
ORGANIZATION
1,
1
(2012)
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/documents/p
ublication/wcms_181953. pdf.

14.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 44.

15.

Id. at 45.

16.

INTERPOL, Types of Human Trafficking, http://www.interpol.int/Crimeareas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/Types-of-human-trafficking (last visited Oct.
26, 2013) (briefly detailing sexual exploitation, forced labour, commercial sexual
exploitation of children in tourism, and trafficking for organs as the most
prevalent forms of human trafficking).

17.

Deven Brewer, Globalization and Human Trafficking, HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN
WELFARE
46,
47
(2009),
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/trafficking/Globalization.pdf
(quoting the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
definition of human trafficking, which states: “trafficking in persons means the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons either by
threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion”).

18.

UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, Human
Trafficking:
The
Facts,
1,
1http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/Forced_labour/HUMA
N_TRAFFICKING_-_THE_FACTS_-_final.pdf (finding that 98% of the human
trafficking victims that are sexually exploited “are women and girls”).

19.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 45 (finding that “98 percent of sex
trafficking victims” are female).

20.

UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note
16, at 2.
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sex or forced labor.” Estimates of human trafficking are imprecise
because of the “disparities in governmental and non-governmental
definitions and the underground nature of human trafficking.”22 However,
the monopolistic competition model can likely best explain a human
trafficking business enterprise.23 This form of imperfect competition
includes many producers that sell products that are slightly differentiated
from each other but are not perfect substitutes.24 “There are many sellers in
the [human trafficking market]” made up of “organized groups of criminals
or small, loose networks of entrepreneurs.”25 And they are all selling the
same product: human beings.
Currently, the benefits to be gained from human trafficking far
outweigh the costs, which assures “a willing cadre of traffickers.”26 While
the profits are in the billions, due to the hidden nature of human trafficking,
the exact effects of this business and the economic consequences if it is
eliminated are not known.27
While HTSE has gained increasing media attention in the last few
years, its prevalence is not a new problem. Since the passing of UNTOC
and the Supplementary Protocol, (together the “Palermo Protocol”) in
2000, many countries are beginning to proactively combat human
trafficking.28 These countries have set up their own frameworks to combat
HTSE and human trafficking for labor purposes. However, of the limited
resources available, more resources are devoted to labor trafficking instead
of sex trafficking.29 This lack of focus on HTSE can compound the
problems associated with combating HTSE.30
21.

Minnesota: A Human Trafficking Battleground, KARE11 (Feb. 16, 2012, 12:14
AM),
http://www.kare11.com/rss/article/959535/14/Minnesota-A-humantrafficking-battleground.

22.

Elizabeth Wheaton, et al., Economics of Human Trafficking 48 INT’L MIGRATION
114, 118 (2010).

23.

Id. at 118-19.

24.

ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITTANICA,
Monopolistic
Competition
Definition,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/390037/monopolistic-competition
(last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (defining the model as a “market situation in which
there may be many independent buyers and many independent sellers
but competition is imperfect because of product differentiation, geographical
fragmentation of the market, or some similar condition”).

25.

WHEATON, supra note 20, at 118-19.

26.

Id. at 119.

27.

Id. at 118 (noting that “[a]ll agencies and researchers cite the need for more
information in order to understand and reduce trafficking in humans.”).

28.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 44 (finding a global increase in reported
prosecutions of traffickers, convictions, and victims identified since the passing
of The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2003).

29.

DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS 2008-2010
(2011) (noting that between January 2008 and June 2010, most suspected
trafficking incidents were sex trafficking (82%), but “[f]ederal agencies were
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Ironically, despite being a profitable enterprise for the traffickers, the
modern human trafficking trade is rooted in the poverty of the victims.31
Traffickers feed off the economic desperation of their victims and prey on
their vulnerabilities in order to coerce, trick, or forcibly recruit them.32
Traffickers lure their victims by exploiting “the dreams and fears of the
poor” and by such means as “fraudulently advertising employment
opportunities.”33 The key to the traffickers’ success is the targeting of the
individuals who are “the most vulnerable and marginalized in society—
people who are already struggling to survive.”34 This most marginalized
segment of society consists of women and girls because of “their greater
susceptibility to poverty, illiteracy, and lower social status,” making it
more difficult for women and girls to escape HTSE once they are
enveloped in it.35 Economic disparities have contributed to the continued
rise of HTSE, mostly in developed nations, and are aided by “cultural
views of women as less valuable than men.”36 These views produce “a
more tolerant view of prostitution and sexual violence”37 leading to a
general lack of public pressure to diminish HTSE in areas where it is the
most prevalent.38
While the root of human trafficking is poverty, its continuation and
growth is fed by demand. Much of this “demand” is from the developed
world, while the “supply” of victims is from the developing world.39 People
who purchase sexual services, a majority of whom are men, “rarely think
about the prostitutes with whom they have sexual relations” and either do
more likely to lead labor trafficking investigations (29%) than sex trafficking
investigations (7%).”).
30.

Id.

31.

See Maciel-Matos, supra note 6, at 330-34 (stating that “[p]overty creates an
environment where women and young people, in seeking to improve their
economic condition, can more easily fall prey to traffickers’ false promises of a
better life elsewhere.”).

32.

Id. at 330 (stating that human trafficking is successful because traffickers prey on
“people who are already struggling to survive on the lowest rungs of the
socioeconomic hierarchy.”).

33.

Id. at 332.

34.

Id. at 330.

35.

Id. at 331.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

Kyle Kim, U.S. Report: Worst Human Trafficking in Africa, Middle East, SOCIAL
CAPITAL REVIEW (Jul. 18, 2011), http://socialcapitalreview.org/u-s-report-worsthuman-trafficking-in-africa-middle-east/ (highlighting how the worst offenders
are in Africa and the Middle East).

39.

SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that “the supply exists because globalization
has caused increasing economic and demographic disparities between the
developing and developed world” and that “current world conditions have created
increased demand and supply.”).
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not care, never bother to find out, or turn a blind eye to whether those
women are there consensually.40 This attitude makes victims exponentially
more difficult to identify as those with the best access to them are doing the
least to help them.
Human trafficking is “built on widespread individual human
suffering”41 and is difficult to combat due to the multiplicity of actors, the
statistical unlikelihood of punishment, and the incredible financial
advantages for participants.42 To that end, the international community
came together in 2000 in Palermo, Italy to set up a framework to fight this
complicated, transnational, and increasingly lucrative criminal practice.
This framework is known as the Palermo Protocol.

B.

Defining Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation

The U.N. definition of HTSE is relatively expansive compared to
national definitions. Trafficking in persons is defined in the Palermo
Protocol as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.43
Human trafficking “does not require an international border to be
crossed” nor “necessarily involve movement or transfer of the victim.”44 It
can occur transnationally or completely within a single State, which is
known as domestic trafficking. The Palermo Protocol definition of human
trafficking (“U.N. definition”) covers both possibilities. It also

40.

Id. at 39 (suggesting that men “happily hire the services of a younger woman who
is compliant and affordable without thinking of why these services are so
accessible.”).

41.

Id. at 39-40.

42.

See Infra Part II. See also Quick Facts About Human Trafficking, END HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
NOW
(last
visited
November
8,
2013),
http://www.endhumantraffickingnow.com/quick-facts-about-human-trafficking/
(stating that the “risk of prosecution is often small in most countries. Punishment
for the crime of human trafficking is lower than for trafficking drugs.”).

43.

A Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3, Dec. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319
[hereinafter The Supplementary Protocol].

44.

BENJAMIN PERRIN, INVISIBLE CHAINS: CANADA’S UNDERGROUND WORLD
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 8 (2010).
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encompasses sex trafficking, exploitative labor trafficking, child soldiers,
and even organ trafficking.45
Since the adoption of the Palermo Protocol, all “relevant U.N.
organizations and agencies, as well as other intergovernmental
organizations” working on HTSE have accepted and use this definition.46
The U.N.’s adoption of this definition of trafficking was controversial—
particularly due to the use of the phrase “sexual exploitation.” Certain
groups advocated the removal of this phrase, arguing that it could
transform the issue of sex trafficking into one that “turn[s] on whether one
believes that all activities in the sex industry constitute ‘sexual
exploitation’ or whether one believes the term . . . only include[s] situations
of forced labor, servitude, or slavery-like practices.”47 The delegates
crafting the Palermo Protocol eventually compromised by listing the
“various forms of trafficking.”48 However, this same controversy continues
at the national and regional level as national legislatures and law
enforcement agencies grapple with drafting legislation that adequately
responds to the multiplicity of factors involved in combating HTSE.
The broad scope of this definition has led to criticism. Such critics
believe that since the definition covers so many different types of
exploitation, it “obscures important differences between trafficking and
exploitation as well as between different exploitative practices.”49 On the
other hand, the wide scope of this definition “extends beyond those
involved in moving [the victim] into the situation of exploitation to
potentially include the individual exploiter [the person who physically uses
the victim for sex].”50

C.

Legal Problems Resulting From Human Trafficking for Sexual
Exploitation

A big obstacle to the implementation of the U.N. definition on an
international scale is the lack of a definition of the word “exploitation.”
While the U.N. definition of human trafficking is reflected in the antitrafficking statutes of the majority of States,51 the differences in how
countries define “exploitation” results in a plethora of important
45.

SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 11 (summarizing the Palermo Protocol).

46.

ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2010).

47.

LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the
Success of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 227, 238 (2003).

48.

Id.

49.

GALLAGHER, supra note 42, at 49.

50.

Id.

51.

Id. at 42 (remarking on how “since 2000, the majority of States have enacted
comprehensive anti-trafficking laws that generally reflect the internationally
agreed definition”).
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differences among said statutes. Although there is no international
consensus as to what constitutes exploitation, “most activists and scholars
appear to accept the validity of some kind of a ‘seriousness’ threshold.”52
Due to the lack of a universally enforced definition of HTSE, not all
situations that constitute HTSE under the U.N. definition are prosecuted as
such within a given State. This hinders cooperation between States.
Additionally, because the prosecutions of these incidents are not
transparent to the international community and do not use the same
definition, there is very little usable case law for lawmakers to utilize.
These problems erode the successes of the practical application of the
Palermo Protocol and need to be addressed in order for the international
community to make significant inroads in the fight against HTSE.

1.

Lack of a Universal Definition

Customarily, UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol leave the form
and content of national legislation prohibiting HTSE to the discretion of
each national government.53 An unintended byproduct of this is that an act
of human trafficking in one country is not necessarily an act of human
trafficking in another. For example, Canada’s definition of human
trafficking is far narrower than the U.N. definition.54 The Canadian
definition of HTSE only addresses persons who are recruited through the
use of force or the threat of force. Therefore, someone who was forced into
trafficking to pay a debt or through psychological manipulation would not
be criminally liable for HTSE in Canada.55 The U.N. definition, on the
other hand, includes those who are recruited through coercion.56
52.

Id.

53.

The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 8-9 (stating that the “State
Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures to
prevent and combat human trafficking”).

54.

PERRIN, supra note 40, at 137 (arguing that the Canadian definition “centres on
the victim’s fear for safety or the safety of someone known to the victim” and
fails to address other methods which should be included including “deception,
fraud, abuse of power/position of vulnerability, or payment of someone to control
the victim”).

55.

Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 423 (Can.). This statute states:
“Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a
term of not more than five years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
conviction who, wrongfully and without lawful authority, for the purpose of
compelling another person to abstain from doing anything that he or she has a
lawful right to do, or to do anything that he or she has a lawful right to abstain
from doing,

·

(a) uses violence or threats of violence to that person or his or her spouse or
common-law partner or children, or injures his or her property;

·

(b) intimidates or attempts to intimidate that person or a relative of that person by
threats that, in Canada or elsewhere, violence or other injury will be done to or
punishment inflicted on him or her or a relative of his or hers, or that the property
of any of them will be damaged;

·

(c) persistently follows that person;
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This definitional issue is also a problem within the United States
framework for combating human trafficking: the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (“TVPA”). The U.S. passed the TVPA in October 2000 with
the goal of “preventing human trafficking overseas, the protection and
assistance of victims in the U.S. and more stringent prosecution and
punishment of traffickers.”57 This Act, which claims to fulfill the
requirements of the Palermo Protocol, in fact limits its HTSE definition.58
Under the TVPA, victims of trafficking are eligible for special visas to
remain in the U.S. while their traffickers are prosecuted but only if they
have been victim to “severe trafficking.”59 This “severe” standard is
problematic and “prevents many victims of human trafficking” from
receiving the special visa, creates “the impression that other types of
human trafficking are less offensive,” and requires law enforcement to
“classify” a victim of human trafficking.60 This classification process often
hinges on the assistance a victim can provide to the prosecution of her
trafficker. However, “the more severe the trafficking, the more a victim
may be psychologically incapable of assisting law enforcement after
rescue” and as such, may not qualify as a victim of severe trafficking.61
The narrowness of the TVPA definition is simply the tip of the iceberg.
Each of the U.S.’s fifty individual states has its own HTSE law.62 This

·

(d) hides any tools, clothes or other property owned or used by that person, or
deprives him or her of them or hinders him or her in the use of them;

·

(e) with one or more other persons, follows that person, in a disorderly manner,
on a highway;

·

(f) besets or watches the place where that person resides, works, carries on
business or happens to be; or

·

(g) blocks or obstructs a highway.”

56.

The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 3(a) (stating that “the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion” is human trafficking).

57.

Id. at 329.

58.

Maciel-Matos, supra note 6, at 336-37 (asserting that “the ‘severe forms of
trafficking’ language raises problems by limiting “assistance and benefits to a
particular type of victim, while creating the impression that other types of human
trafficking are less offensive.”).

59.

Id. at 336 (“Severe trafficking is: (a) Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex
act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to
perform such act has not attained [eighteen] years of age; or (B) the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services,
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage or slavery.”).

60.

Id. at 336-37.

61.

Id.

62.

Wyoming Becomes 50th State to Outlaw Human Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.polarisproject.org/media-center/press-releases/742wyoming-becomes-50th-state-to-outlaw-human-trafficking (announcing that
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creates additional complications as these laws “are as varied as the states
themselves.”63 As the current state of the law in the U.S. illustrates, HTSE
definitions are not uniform even within the same country. Without
uniformity, prosecution of HTSE remains patchwork and cooperation
efforts stalled. Without cooperation, HTSE continues to flourish.

2.

Transnational Issues That Hinder Cooperation

Domestic HTSE, situations in which persons are trafficked within their
own State, occurs in a majority of countries.64 However, victims of HTSE
can also be victims brought to a State from other States.65 To combat this
type of HTSE, international coordination is essential as “State-centered
approaches to combat trafficking are proving obsolete and futile since
human trafficking knows no [S]tate boundaries.”66
Whether the trafficking is international or domestic, human trafficking
networks “are often highly organized, sophisticated mobile enterprises,”
and are capable of quickly relocating “to avoid detection and
prosecution.”67 Catching up to these mobile networks requires significant
cooperation between different law enforcement agencies within a State and
even more coordination when the networks are transnational.
To stop the international traffic in human beings, a tool such as the
Offenders of Humanity Database must expose the patterns of HTSE
criminal networks to the public. This will ensure these networks are
targeted by anti-trafficking legislation and law enforcement efforts.
Unfortunately, currently networks are able to flourish invisible to public
view.68 For example, many wealthy pedophiles from countries like the
Wyoming became the last American state to pass a HTSE law when Governor
Mead signed the state’s “first bill to protect victims and prosecute traffickers”).
63.

Kelly Heinrich and Kavitha Sreeharsha, The State of State Human Trafficking
Laws, 52 THE JUDGES’ JOURNAL 28, 29 (Winter 2013) (discussing how
widely HTSE state laws vary across the United States).

64.

Sex Trafficking in the United States, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AID,
http://www.crisisaid.org/ICAPDF/Trafficking/traffickstats.pdf (Despite the U.S.’s
proactive prosecution of HTSE, almost 300,000 American children are at risk for
trafficking into the sex industry).

65.

Human Trafficking FAQs, U.N.O.D.C. (last visited Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/faqs.html#What_is_human_trafficking (stating how “trafficking often
occurs from less developed countries to more developed countries”).

66.

Brewer, supra note 15, at 47 (2010) (discussing how globalization has facilitated
human trafficking).

67.

Miriam Cohen, Note, Piracy and Human Trafficking, 16 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
201, 223 (2010) (discussing how globalization has provided an ideal environment
for trafficking networks to maximize their territory).

68.

Darla Carmichael, Human Trafficking In My Backyard, SEX, VIOLENCE,
PARENTING & OTHER CHARACTER FLAWS (Aug. 22, 2012 9:37 AM),
http://darlasbooks.wordpress.com/2012/08/23/human-trafficking-in-my-backyard
(“Someone mentioned human trafficking. My first thought was – no, this is Fort
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United States, Japan, and parts of Western Europe participate in child
prostitution through the sex tourism industry in Asia and Latin America.
This industry is officially illegal but is secretly subsidized by corruption.
The sex tourism industry generally flourishes in States “that do not have a
stable or strong economy,” and those where “a large part of the population
is undernourished . . . and is dying of the consequences of malnutrition.”69
Since “minors constitute a large percentage of the population,”70 these
States are breeding grounds for HTSE. Travel agencies, hotel owners, and
governments alike, their cooperation hidden from public view, facilitate
and promote this industry.71 As the illegal sex industry “flourishes by
exploiting the misery of famished families,”72 the public is often unaware
of the institutions in their own home countries that support this miserable
enterprise. Once the general public is aware of the illegal sex industry, it
may be easier to significantly diminish it.

3.

Lack of Transparency in Prosecution

Despite the sophistication of the HTSE enterprises, human traffickers
are being prosecuted. “Five thousand trafficking prosecutions were
recorded globally” in 2008 alone, leading to “almost three thousand
convictions.”73 However, in 2008, an estimated 2.5 million persons, twothirds of whom are women and children, were forced into commercial sex
trafficking.74 In this context with this number of victims, these conviction
numbers are unacceptably low; especially considering how the number of
individuals trafficked is likely substantially higher than the official
estimates given the covert nature of the HTSE.
In addition, many of these prosecutions and the process by which they
come about are not visible to the public. Neither are the all the actors that
participate in HTSE. This lack of transparency inhibits societies from
recognizing the true scope of the problem. An important reason for this

Worth, an urban city with a uniquely small town feel. Nothing ever happens in
Fort Worth.”).
69.

Id. at 582 (elaborating on the socio-economic background of the supplying
countries).

70.

Id. (pointing out that child prostitution is mainly present in underdeveloped and
developing countries).

71.

Karene Jullien, Note, The Recent International Efforts to End Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Children, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 579, 585 (2003)
(discussing how some governments in developing countries ignore or profit from
sex tourism involving minors).

72.

Id. at 582-83 (discussing how the fight for survival leads children in indigent
families to become engaged in prostitution).

73.

PERRIN, supra note 40, at 118 (discussing the small number of HTSE related
convictions in Canada).

74.

SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 5 (citing data from the International Labour
Organization).
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problem is the diversity of actors that participate in HTSE.75 Some of these
actors are criminal in that the entirety of their occupation violates HTSE
laws; others have an official job that is legal, but use it to facilitate HTSE
crimes; still others walk the fine line between legal and illegal.76
Criminal actors could be anyone—from the main organizers and
regional leaders to the procurers (those who actually “obtain” the victims)
or pimps.77 While the roles of individuals vary in each criminal group and
the context of different cases, all of these actors are directly involved in
HTSE, and are often the same nationality as their victims.78 These
individuals are more likely to be charged and prosecuted because they are
among the most visible members of the trafficking operation.
The other types of participants are legal and semi-legal actors. These
individuals generally benefit from human trafficking indirectly, and are
deliberately or willfully blind in facilitating HTSE.79 They may be taxi
drivers, travel agents, and restaurant owners.80 While their day jobs do not
directly involve them in HTSE, they use these roles to facilitate HTSE as a
business enterprise. For example, a landlord may rent out rooms to women
he knows are being forced to exchange sexual services for money. He
benefits through the rent provided, and the traffickers get a safe place to
exploit their victims. Under the current HTSE international framework, he
is generally not prosecuted although he is aiding and abetting HTSE by
providing a safe place for traffickers to exploit and profit. Since the
landlord plays a significant role in facilitating HTSE, this Note seeks to end
the impunity of individuals like the landlord who facilitate HTSE by
making their facilitation public.
All of these actors, whether directly involved in HTSE criminal
networks or simply indirectly supporting or participating in the human
trafficking system, must be prosecuted for HTSE to be effectively
eliminated. Heightened public awareness of sex trafficking could
incentivize prosecutors to prosecute traffickers with greater zeal. As this
Note discusses later, the public is generally unaware of HTSE prosecution
efforts.81 This results in an absence of public support for combating HTSE,

75.

Id. at 6 (discussing the diversity of actors who participate in human trafficking).

76.

See infra note 164.

77.

MINNA VIUHKO & ANNIINA JOKINEN, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED
CRIME: TRAFFICKING FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ORGANIZED PROCURING IN
FINLAND 76 (2009) (discussing the division of labor between various criminal
actors involved in HTSE).

78.

Id. at 76-77 (explaining that the main organizers of pandering groups operating in
Finland are often Estonians or Russians).

79.

Id. at 81 (describing the roles of different legal and semi-legal actors).

80.

Id. (identifying categories such as taxi drivers, owners and staff of hotels, bars
and restaurants, as well as ferry companies, as beneficiaries of HTSE).

81.

See supra Part III.
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which allows prosecutors to get away with offering minimal sentences for
individuals perpetrating HTSE.82
Canada is an example of a country with weak public support for
combating HTSE, brought on among other things by a non-transparent
prosecution system. This lack of support results in weak sentences for
HTSE crimes that contribute more to impunity than actual prosecution. For
example, the first person convicted of human trafficking in Canada was in
2008, five years after the Palermo Protocol supposedly was in effect in
Canada.83 After pleading guilty to charges of human trafficking, the
trafficker received less than four years in prison. He was found guilty of
forcing both a fourteen-year-old girl and an eighteen-year-old woman into
prostitution for two years through violence and threats. He received
hundreds of thousands of dollars from his victims.84 While prosecution of
traffickers is increasing in Canada, progress of prosecuting more traffickers
is slow as officials continue to deport witnesses and charge traffickers with
lesser offenses that carry far lower sentences in an effort to keep cases from
being taken to the Supreme Court.85 If the Canadian efforts to fight HTSE
were more transparent, prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officials
alike would be incentivized to vigorously pursue and impose just sentences
and fully implement Canada’s anti-trafficking laws.

4.

Lack of Case Law

While many countries have national legislations prohibiting HTSE,
very few use them to the extent necessary to competently prosecute and
diminish HTSE. In 2011, the UNODC developed a database in an effort to
“increase both the capacity and awareness of the law enforcement to better
respond to trafficking . . . [and to] . . . provide immediate, public access to
officially documented instances of this crime.”86 Access to reliable and
informative case law is necessary due to the “lack of knowledge and
understanding on the global stage” of HTSE.87
82.

Margie Reese, Sex Traffickers Must Be Dealt Heavier Penalties, THE
SOUTHWESTERN COLLEGE SUN, (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theswcsun.com/sextraffickers-must-be-dealt-heavier-penalties/ (discussing Proposition 35 and the
hope that sex traffickers will face higher sentences).

83.

Tamara Cherry, Human Traffic Twist, TORONTO SUN, (Dec. 26, 2008),
http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2008/12/26/7852636-sun.html
(discussing how human trafficking was added to the Canadian Criminal Code in
November 2005, but the first convictions were in 2008).

84.

PERRIN, supra note 40, at 123-24 (discussing Canada’s first convicted human
trafficker).

85.

Id. at 130 (discussing the apparent reluctance of Canadian prosecutors to bring
human trafficking charges against criminal actors).

86.

Id. (“The database contains details on victims’ and perpetrators’ nationalities,
trafficking routes, verdicts and other information related to prosecuted cases from
across the world.”).

87.

Id. (discussing how the database aims at increasing awareness and understanding
regarding the legal issues behind human trafficking).
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The UNODC database, however, does not go far enough. Contribution
to the database is voluntary and it is often individual law firms or NGOs
that make the contributions.88 These contributors may not be in the best
position to report accurate information on these cases, and their
information may come solely from the specific areas in a country where
they operate. Case law needs to come from an official and verifiable
source, such as the national governments of these countries as they are in
the best position to report on HTSE prosecutions and incidents from all
over their respective countries.
The lack of HTSE case law creates significant problems in prosecuting
HTSE, as there is a lack of legal precedent that prosecutors can use in
prosecuting HTSE cases. This leads to less HTSE cases prosecuted, which
may deter law enforcement from investigating alleged HTSE incidents.
These conclusions are supported by the Urban Institute-Northeastern
Institute June 2012 study researching HTSE in the U.S. This study found
that state prosecutors in the U.S. have difficulty pursuing human trafficking
cases because they, among other factors, “lack legal precedent and case law
to guide effective use of state human trafficking laws.”89 This demonstrates
how even one of the most powerful and wealthy countries in the world with
an active HTSE prosecution framework continues to struggle with HTSE
due to the lack of legal precedent. This issue must be addressed for any
successful global effort to significantly reduce HTSE.
Four problems damage efforts to combat HTSE: the lack of a universal
definition, limited international cooperation, minimal transparency in
prosecutions, and limited case law. While some of these problems are
addressed in the international legal framework to combat HTSE, many still
exist and hinder progress to eliminate HTSE. Any internationally
successful campaign to combat HTSE needs to effectively address these
four problems and the other major deficiencies in the Supplementary
Protocol. The time for such a campaign is now.

II. DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO
COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
The four problems with the current battle against HTSE have been
partially caused and exacerbated by the deficiencies in the Palermo
Protocol. These deficiencies need to be solved.

88.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Human Trafficking Case Law
Database, https://www.unodc.org/cld/en/about/contributors.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2013) (listing institutions and individuals who have contributed to the
UNODC human trafficking case law database).

89.

URBAN INSTITUTE, Identifying Challenges to Improve the Investigation of State
and
Local
Human
Trafficking
Cases,
1,
7,
(2012),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412592-State-and-Local-HumanTrafficking-Cases.pdf (discussing the challenges law enforcement and
prosecutors face in prosecuting cases using human trafficking statutes).
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A. The International Legal Framework

The international framework used to combat HTSE is made up of
UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol. UNTOC was signed in
December of 2000 in Palermo, Italy, and came into force in December
2003.90 UNTOC focuses on organized crime generally. The language of
UNTOC “represents the interests of governments rather than individuals.”91
This important distinction accounts for the lack of language concerning
support for trafficking victims. Instead, any victim support is provided to
victims through a Party’s respective national legislation. With these issues
in mind, UNTOC was supplemented through U.N. Resolution by the
Supplementary Protocol, which focuses on HTSE and emphasizes women
and children as victims of sex trafficking.92
Taken together, UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol, along with
the Conference of the Parties established by UNTOC as an oversight
mechanism,93 make up the international legal framework to combat HTSE.
This framework, however, is deficient in a number of ways and these
deficiencies cripple the effectiveness of this framework.

B.

The Deficiencies in the UNTOC in the Context of Human
Trafficking

The drafters of UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol drafted both
instruments with weak and problematic language, which creates
deficiencies with serious consequences. These deficiencies cripple the
effectiveness of both UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol and
contribute to the continuance of what former U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan considers “one of the most egregious violations of human rights
[human trafficking] the United Nations now confronts.”94 Some of the
deficiencies created by the language of UNTOC are in Articles 27 and 28.
Article 27 is entitled “Law enforcement cooperation” and discusses
law enforcement cooperation on organized crime.95 The Article begins with
90.

SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing the adoption of the United Nations
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime).

91.

Id. (explaining why the text of UNTOC does not address the needs of trafficking
victims and national and regional legislation on human trafficking).

92.

G.A. Res. 55/25, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) (“Adopts the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially of
Women and Children . . .”).

93.

GALLAGHER, supra note 42, at 466 (finding that the role of the Conference of the
Parties is “to promote and review implementation of UNTOC” and is “entrusted
with oversight function.”).

94.

Kofi A. Annan, Forward to United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.

95.

United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto, art. 27, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter
UNTOC].
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strong language: “State Parties shall cooperate closely with one another”
on the crimes demarcated in UNTOC [emphasis added].96 Additionally,
“each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective measures” of creating
and enhancing modes of communication between parties [emphasis
added].97 This robust language is essential to the success of UNTOC
because it holds the State Parties to a specific promise in order to comply
with UNTOC.
However, the strong language is not consistent throughout the Article
and stops short of requiring Parties to make agreements or arrangements
that facilitate cooperation. For example, instead of using language such as
shall enter into or shall adopt, the Article suggests that States “shall
consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements
on direct cooperation” [emphasis added].98 This less forceful language
allows the State Parties to avoid the requirements laid out in the text while
still objectively complying with UNTOC. Article 27 moves on to inform
Parties that they “may consider this Convention as the basis for mutual law
enforcement cooperation” and “shall make full use of agreements or
arrangements . . . to enhance the cooperation between their law
enforcement agencies” whenever appropriate.99 The Article concludes with
“State Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond to
transnational organized crime committed through the use of modern
technology.”100
Weak language, such as “shall endeavor,” “may consider,” or “shall”
with the qualifier “whenever appropriate” grants too much discretion to the
Parties and enables them to avoid the Article’s directives while still
objectively complying with UNTOC. As such, it provides no compulsion
for States to engage in activities that are essential to combat HTSE. The
Article also fails to delineate any particular framework or avenue for the
specified cooperation. It also does not provide any means of tracking the
compliance with this Article. In sum, this weak language allows Parties to
technically comply with UNTOC without actually taking the steps required
to do so.
Article 28 is simpler than Article 27 as it does not require the Parties to
adopt or create anything new. Instead, it asks each State Party to collect
data and analyze the organized crime within its borders, to share this
analytical expertise with one another, and to monitor the effectiveness of its
developed strategies to diminish organized crime.101 While each of these
requests is crucial to effective international cooperation on this issue,
Article 28 does not require the State Parties take such steps. Instead, this
96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 28.
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Article only provides that each State Party “shall consider” taking the
above actions.102
Article 28 fails to provide a means of accountability of the
implementation of UNTOC’s provisions because the State Parties are not
required to collect data on organized crime (which would include human
trafficking). Without this data a State will not know whether its efforts to
combat are successful. And if such efforts are unsuccessful, a State will not
know that it needs to develop a new strategy. As with Article 27, much of
the language in Article 28 is far too weak to adequately support the
exceptionally important provisions it contains.

2.

The Deficiencies Illustrated Through the Story of Cambodia

Cambodia is a party to UNTOC and an enlightening example of its
deficiencies.103 Unofficial estimates of sex trafficking suggest “there are as
many as 15,000 prostituted persons from Phnom Pehn and that up to 35%
of them have been smuggled into Cambodia from China or Vietnam.”104
These “girls are bound by contracts to a brothel owner” and have to pay off
this debt through providing sexual services before they can keep any of
their earnings for themselves.105
Cambodia is listed as a Tier 2 country by the U.S. State Department
Trafficking in Persons Report,106 which signifies that Cambodia does not
comply with the minimum requirements of the TVPA107 but is making
significant efforts to do so.108 Despite Cambodia’s alleged significant
efforts, the Cambodian police cannot put “the Svay Pak brothel area
outside Phnom Penh, where children are exploited in the sex trade” out of
business as it “continues to operate despite numerous attempts by police to
close it down.”109 According to the State Department Report, the “sale of

102. Id.
103. UNTOC, supra note 90, at list of parties.
104. Donna M. Hughes, Laura J. Sporcic & Nadine Z. Mendelsohn, Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women: Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation (October 2004),
http://www.continuetolearn.uiowa.edu/laborctr/child_labor/materials/pdf/modules
/child_trafficking.pdf.
105. Id.
106. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 106 (“Cambodia is a source, transit, and
destination country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced
labor and sex trafficking.”).
107. Id. at 41 (explaining that Tier 2 Countries are those that “do not fully comply with
the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring
themselves into compliance with those standards”).
108. Id. at 107 (“The Government of Cambodia does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so.”).
109. Id.
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virgin girls continues to be a serious problem in Cambodia.”110 Cambodian
men “form the largest source of demand for child prostitution though a
significant number of men from the United States and Europe, as well as
other Asian countries, travel to Cambodia to engage in child sex
tourism.”111 Cambodia not only has large numbers of persons trafficked
internally, it also acts as a transit center for victims trafficked to Thailand
and Vietnam.112 Cambodia’s lack of partnerships with Thailand, Vietnam,
and other countries in the region hinder any effort it may be exerting to
curb HTSE, as they are unable to coordinate anti-HTSE efforts without
these partnerships.113
Aside from lack of cooperation, the State Department has singled out
another issue in its recommendations to Cambodia:114 the fact that there are
serious prosecution, transparency, and impunity issues as a result of
corruption. Without an international monitoring system, Cambodia is
unable to fulfill its obligation to increase prosecutions as required by the
Palermo Protocol. For example, in 2010 “three convicted foreign
pedophiles–one of whom is also a sex trafficking offender and one of
whom was convicted in the largest child sex offender case in Cambodian
history–were pardoned and released early from prison.”115 Additionally, in
2011 the former head of the Phnom Penh Municipal Police’s Anti-Human
Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department “was convicted in absentia
and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on complicity charges,
including accepting payments from brothels in exchange for protection and
information on future raids.”116 Corruption charges and concerns coming

110. Id.
111. Id.; see also supra notes 69-72.
112.

HUMANTRAFFICKING.ORG,

Structure of Cambodian Taskforce on Human
Trafficking,
http://www.humantrafficking.org/uploads/publications/Coordination_Structure__Diagram1.pdf (listing Vietnam and Thailand as target areas for a national
taskforce on human trafficking).

113. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at, 107 (recommending that Cambodia
“increase engagement with governments of destination countries”).
114. Id. at 107.
115. Id. at 108.
116. Id. (recommending that Cambodia “increase engagement with governments of
destination countries”); see also (discussing allegations of “law enforcement and
government officials are believed to have accepted bribes to facilitate the
trafficking and sex trade. There are reports of government officials who are
complicit in the trafficking by accepting bribes.”); Cambodia: Human Trafficking
Crackdown Also Hits HIV Prevention, PLUSNEWS (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.plusnews.org/Report/81036/CAMBODIA-Human-traffickingcrackdown-also-hits-HIV-prevention (“Sex workers called the crackdown a
‘moral crusade’ in protests during June, after reports revealed that the police were
detaining sex workers as traffickers and sometimes demanding sexual favors and
bribes.”).
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out of this incident were never investigated or addressed.117 Local observers
believe that “the cause of impunity” afforded to perpetrators contribute to
trafficking.118
Without a proper incentive, Cambodia will continue to allow
corruption and impunity to reign while continuing to make “significant
efforts” to combat HTSE. If there is increased transparency the rest of
world will know when to provide pressure to facilitate change. As
demonstrated above, the deficiencies in UNTOC exacerbate the HTSE
issues already confronted by Cambodia. A tool is needed to solve these
problems as well as to confront the other obstacles to HTSE elimination in
Cambodia: impunity and corruption.

3.

The Deficiencies Illustrated Through the Story of Canada

Canada is another example of a country that exhibits the Palermo
Protocol’s deficiencies. Despite having signed the Supplementary Protocol
and UNTOC, Canada did not make “trafficking in persons” a criminal
offense until late 2005.119 Canada only added this offense after
experiencing political embarrassment when the country was rated Tier 2 in
the State Department Human Trafficking Report of 2003.120 The first
conviction for HTSE did not occur until June 2008.121
A few years ago, UNODC asked Canada to provide information on
human trafficking prosecutions and convictions in Canada, presumably for
the UNODC human trafficking case law database.122 However, Canada
declined to provide this information because “no central database in
Canada collects this information and most prosecutions are carried out
locally.” 123 As a result, there were no official statistics to report.124
Additionally, when Crown prosecutors looked for case law to find
sentencing references for their new HTSE cases, they could not find any.125
117. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 108.
118. Id.
119. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 118 (Canada took until late 2005 to make ‘trafficking in
persons’ a Criminal Code offence and did not secure its first conviction until June
2008.”).
120. U.S. DEP’T
country).

OF

STATE, supra note 2, at 46 (listing Canada as a Tier 2 status

121. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 118.
122. Id. at 120 (“When the federal government was asked recently to provide the
information to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime for its annual Report on
Trafficking in Persons.”).
123. Id. at 118.
124. Id. at 120.
125. Id. at 120-21(discussing the lack of case law available due to most sentences did
not appear in typical databases used by the legal profession making it difficult to
find case law.).
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The prosecutors needed these sentencing references because by 2009,
sentences handed down for the few HTSE cases prosecuted were so pitiful
that the Canadian Parliament “introduced Bill C-268 in January 2009 [to
establish] a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for convicted child
traffickers.”126 But this was only for child traffickers as judges in Canada
seemed to have “succumbed to the myth of the fallen woman: that women
forced into prostitution have no value or virtue, so crimes committed
against them . . . do not merit punishment.”127 This myth has had practical
consequences “on the handful of pimps who have been convicted of human
trafficking generally receive overly lenient sentences-a slap on the
wrist.”128 Currently, Canada is ranked as a Tier 1 country, which is a
country that meets the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking
as determined by the U.S. State Department.129
Despite Canada’s Tier 1 status, many researchers and experts find that
Canada’s definition of HTSE, as discussed earlier, is too narrow.130
Additionally, Canada’s “limited coordination between the federal and
provincial governments on anti-trafficking efforts continue[] to hamper
more effective collaboration.”131 The U.S. State Department’s
recommendations encourage Canada to increase its cooperation efforts,
HTSE data gathering, investigations, and prosecutions of Canadians who
participate in HTSE abroad.132 As the Canadian example illustrates, a
country can “comply” with UNTOC but still have serious issues with its
anti-HTSE network. This is a serious consequence of the deficiencies in
UNTOC that erodes the success of anti-HTSE efforts.

D.

Did the Supplementing Protocol “Cure” These Deficiencies?

Before discussing the practical problems caused by the weak language
of Articles 27 and 28, it must first be determined whether the
Supplementary Protocol renders these problems moot. If the
Supplementary Protocol resolved the deficiencies created by these Articles,
then the international HTSE framework is solid or “cured,” since the
126. Michael Rappaport, Canada’s Pitiful Track Record in Combating Human
Trafficking,
THE
LAWYERS
WEEKLY
(Feb.
4,
2011),
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1342
(discussing sexual exploitation in Canada).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 38 (A tier 1 country is one that meets “the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”).
130. Id. (discussing the suggestion that Canada’s definition of exploitation for the
purposes of the offenses is too narrow.)
131. Id.
132. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 110 (recommending that Canada “increase
investigations and prosecutions of Canadian child sex tourists abroad; continue
efforts to improve trafficking data collection; and strengthen coordination among
national and provincial governments”).
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Supplementary Protocol “is to be interpreted together with U.N.
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.”133
1.

The Deficiencies That Were “Cured”

Article 10 the Supplementary Protocol, entitled “Information Exchange
and Training,” is the section that could cure the deficiencies in UNTOC’s
Articles 27 and 28. This Article discusses multiple topics on human
trafficking that State Parties should share.134 It also imposes an obligation
on the Parties to train and strengthen their law enforcement on the
prevention of HTSE.135 However, the language of the Supplementary
Protocol does not reach the crux of the deficiencies in UNTOC because it
stops short of requiring State Parties to share this information.

2.

The Deficiencies That Were Not “Cured”
a.

Lack of a Universal Definition

Since the HTSE definition comes from the Supplementary Protocol
and not UNTOC, the Supplementary Protocol did not cure the lack of a
universal definition of HTSE.136 While the Parties may have intended the
definition to be universal, this is not how it is used in practice.137

b.

Lack of International Cooperation

While Article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol focuses on
international cooperation on HTSE data, it holds that “State Parties shall,
as appropriate, cooperate with one another by exchanging information, in
accordance with their domestic law” [emphasis added]. The Article then
lists the various subject matters on which the State Parties should
collaborate.138 The “as appropriate” and “in accordance with their domestic
law” qualifiers supply the State Parties with far too much discretion in
complying with the Supplementary Protocol.
Further expounding this problem, the last section of Article 10 states “a
State Party that receives information shall comply with any request by the
State Party that transmitted the information that places restrictions on its
use.”139 This final provision allows a State, after actually being moved to
share information, to put any restrictions on the use of the information.
133. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 1.
134. Id. at art. 10.
135. Id. (discussing the necessity that Parties strengthen their law enforcement
training).
136. See supra Part I.
137. Id.
138. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 10 (discussing that Parties
should share information regarding individuals crossing international borders
with travel documents that do not belong to them or by using means and methods
that are known practices of organized crime).
139. Id.
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Hypothetically, a State could “share” information and render it completely
useless at the same time by not allowing this information to be used in an
effective manner.

c. Lack of Transparency in Prosecution
Just as there is no facilitation of international cooperation in the
Supplementary Protocol, there is also no requirement that States make their
trafficking information available to the public or to other State Parties. The
absence of such a provision calls into question the entirety of the
information sharing aspect of the Supplementary Protocol in Article 10.140
After all, if countries do not need to gather this information and make it
transparent by publishing it, then other countries will not know what
information to request. Also, if countries are not required to gather
information, a country may not have any information to share when asked.
The lack of transparency thus continues to wreak havoc with the
implementation of the Palermo Protocol.

d.

Lack of Case Law

Since States are not required to gather or publish information, there is
even less case law available on HTSE. The Supplementary Protocol did not
solve this problem as it does not put the obligation to collect information
on the States. For all of these reasons, the Supplementary Protocol does not
fix the deficiencies in the international framework to combat HTSE.

e.

Examples of the “Grey Zones” Caused by the Failure of The
Supplementary Protocol to Cure These Deficiencies

The presence of the deficiencies in the Palermo Protocol create “grey
zones” or places where a State is technically complying with the text of the
treaties without taking the substantive action necessary to curb HTSE such
as sharing HTSE data with other States. The grey zones present in this
international framework are best explained through the examples of
Australia and France, both of whom are parties to the Palermo Protocol and
are listed as Tier 1 countries in the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons Report. 141
The U.S. State Department found Australia to comply with the
Palermo Protocol’s minimum standards.142 Despite this status, Australia
only prosecuted one person for labor trafficking in 2013, a decrease from
four convictions and thirteen prosecutions from the previous year.143
140. Id.
141. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 51 (stating that Tier 1 status signifies that
the country is complying with the minimum standards of the Palermo Protocol,
as determined by the U.S. State Department).
142. Id. at 74 (discussing that Australia is complying with the minimum standards to
eliminate trafficking).
143. Id.
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Australia’s anti-trafficking focus is on transnational sex trafficking, which
while meritorious, comes at the expense of domestic trafficking. In fact, the
Australian government has “never identified or prosecuted a domestic sex
trafficking offense”144 and bases the existence of domestic trafficking on
the amount that is reported.145 This is a flawed strategy as it ignores the
problems of domestic trafficking until it is officially reported. Instead,
Australia should proactively try to determine whether there is any domestic
trafficking in Australia. This would allow Australia to confront domestic
trafficking problems and curb domestic HTSE instead of hiding from the
issue all together.
France is also listed as a Tier 1 country by the U.S. State
Department.146 While the French government has increased prosecutions
and the transparency of its anti-trafficking efforts, certain French laws
cause many trafficking cases to be charged as pimping cases.147 This makes
international collaboration on HTSE difficult as such collaboration would
require law enforcement or policy makers to separate out the trafficking
cases from the pimping cases in order to develop successful strategies to
target HTSE.148 The mixing of HTSE and pimping cases together makes it
more difficult to see HTSE patterns and therefore successfully develop
strategies to confront them. It also increases the difficulty of gathering
information on HTSE in France to support HTSE prevention efforts and
share to with international and regional partners.
As demonstrated through the examples of Australia and France, the
Palermo Protocol did not fix the problems with the current framework to
combat HTSE, and in certain circumstances, exacerbated the situation.
While nations cannot be made to cooperate on HTSE through force, there
are ways to apply political pressure to facilitate this exchange. But to do so,
the public must be aware of the situation.

III. THE SOLUTION: THE OFFENDERS OF HUMANITY DATABASE
To solve the deficiencies described previously as well as other issues
with the current framework to combat HTSE, a single, easy-to-use
instrument is required. This Note proposes, as a tool to fix the current
144. Id. at 73-74.
145. Strengthening Australia’s Response to Human Trafficking, ANTI-SLAVERY
PROJECT
(Mar.
30,
2010),
http://www.awcaus.org.au/resources/documents/TraffickingUpdate-UTS.pdf
(discussing that limited statistical information is available about trafficking in
Australia only accounts for victims of trafficking who have come into contact
with law enforcement authorities).
146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 159 (listing France as a Tier 1 Country).
147. Id. (discussing France’s flaws in classifying crimes as pimping rather than
trafficking).
148. Id. (discussing France’s flaws in classifying crimes as pimping rather than
trafficking).
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deficiencies with the HTSE framework, increase transparency, and
diminish the demand for HTSE, the institution of the Offenders of
Humanity Database (“the Database”). Nations that are Parties to the
Palermo Protocol will be required to submit the requisite information.149
This Database should be on the Internet, managed by the UNDOC, and it
will serve as a centralized information center where NGOs, governments,
and individuals can obtain information on HTSE and the implementation of
the Palermo Protocol. Putting this tool on the Internet will make it available
to an audience that spans socioeconomic backgrounds.150 The Database will
provide information on HTSE prosecutions and sentences to fill the case
law void and provide transparency on the implementation of the Palermo
Protocol.

A.

The Basics of the Database

The Database will be a combination of an American sex offender
registry and an international case law database, such as the database run by
UNODC on human trafficking that was discussed previously.151 The
Palermo Protocol will be amended to require all of the Parties to submit
certain data on HTSE to UNODC.152 The Database will replace the current
UNODC database.
UNODC is the logical choice to house the Database because UNODC
already has a system set up to receive information from all over the world.
It also has the institutional knowledge and expertise along with an
established funding network.153 While the U.S. State Department is another
option, as it analyzes and compiles significant amounts of information on
HTSE for its Trafficking in Persons reports, the information comes from
U.S. embassies and not the countries themselves.154 Also, since the U.S.
State Department decides what countries are complying with the standards
of the Palermo Protocol, there is too much room for suspected bias.155 An

149. GALLAGHER, supra note 42, at 370 (the international community has
“acknowledged the need for an effective criminal justice response to trafficking”).
150. Nicole Ferraro, The Internet & the Developing World, INTERNET EVOLUTION (Jan.
24, 2008), http://www.internetevolution.com/document.asp?doc_id=143698
(remarking on how “costs have been driven down to affordable levels for people
on very low incomes”).
151. U.N.O.D.C., supra note 82.
152. UNTOC, supra note 90, at art. 30 (a State Party to UNTOC may propose an
amendment, which will be considered by the Conference of the Parties. If a
consensus is not reached, the amendment will go to a vote and be passed by a 2/3
vote).
153. U.N.O.D.C., supra note 82.
154. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 37.
155. Id.
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agency not tied to a particular State, like the UNODC, will avoid any such
accusations.156
The data that Parties to the Palermo Protocol will be required to submit
to the Database should at a minimum include:
·The name, nationality, home address, age, and photograph of all
persons convicted of any and all HTSE charges;157
·The country or organization who apprehended the person;
·The country or organization that tried and convicted the person;
·The full case law and criminal history of such persons including a
detailed explanation of the facts of the case;
·The sentence imposed for all persons convicted of any and all HTSE
charges, including where and when the sentence will be served.
The data outlined above should be made accessible to the general
public free of charge as the UNODC database is now.158 However, when
national or international law requires, the names of witnesses or victims
and any other witness or victim identifying information may be redacted to
protect these witnesses and victims. Additionally, individuals who are
accused of HTSE offenses but are acquitted will not have their names or
personal information listed; however, the case law will still be published to
increase the amount of case law available on HTSE. The Database will also
have a search feature, which will allow users to search for a particular
person’s name or an individual country’s case law. If a person’s
information is already in the Database, then any new charges or additional
information should be added to his or her entry. These suggestions do not
provide a ceiling on what information may be provided to the Database but
rather a floor; the more information provided the better the prosecution and
prevention efforts will be.

B.

The Purposes of the Database

The Database has several purposes. It will fill the deficiencies in the
Palermo Protocol, diminish the demand for HTSE, end the impunity of
those who facilitate HTSE but are not yet being prosecuted as traffickers,
and deter others from becoming involved in HTSE in the first place. As
detailed above, this will be achieved through providing an accessible and

156. Compare Huiqin Du, Many Countries Denounce US Trafficking in Persons
Reports,
CAIXUN
NEWS
(Jun.
26,
2012)
http://watchingamerica.com/News/164763/many-countries-denounce-ustrafficking-in-persons-report/ (discussing the criticisms of the Trafficking in
Persons Report from around the globe such as Russia refusing “to accept the
report’s content and pointed out that the U.S. provides its soldiers stationed
abroad with prostitutes”).
157. See UNTOC, supra note 90, at art. 18 (this article requires much of this
information to be shared among nations upon receipt of a mutual assistance
request).
158. See U.N.O.D.C., supra note 82 (providing an example of free online database
similar to what the author is describing).
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easy-to-use way to determine whether State Parties are implementing the
Palermo Protocol.

1.

Building a Universal Definition

Providing a central location for the compilation on prosecutions of
HTSE cases will allow a true international definition of HTSE to emerge.
As cases are prosecuted and prosecutors and judges from around the world
are able to read these decisions, a definition that fits the crime of HTSE
will develop as decision-makers will have enough data to make an
informed decision. While the U.N. definition may be too broad, other
definitions such as the TVPA’s are too narrow and leave many HTSE cases
un-prosecutable as such. As countries cooperate and build anti-HTSE
prosecution strategies from each other’s case law, the practical
implementation of human trafficking definitions will standardize and bring
about a true international definition of HTSE.159

2.

Encouraging International Cooperation

Through publishing the names and personal information of those
convicted of HTSE offenses, as well as the applicable case law, countries
will find it easier to cooperate on HTSE issues because they will be able to
track HTSE more effectively. For example, with respect to Cambodia’s
booming sex tourist industry, discussed previously,160 the Database would
allow Cambodian customs officials to check a tourist’s name before giving
him a visa. If officials discover that the tourist was convicted of any HTSE
charges, they can deny him a visa based on the conviction as he is likely a
sex tourist. These efforts will encourage international cooperation and save
countries a lot of time and effort in the long run. Countries will now be able
to keep sex tourists out of the country efficiently and at low cost by simply
checking the Database.
By having all State Parties record their HTSE data in one central
location, each State Party will now know what other information and
expertise that other State Parties possess. Ideally, this knowledge will aid in
their requests for mutual assistance.161

3.

Providing Transparency in Prosecutions

By making each conviction and sentence public, the local populace and
the international community will be aware of a nation’s efforts towards
combating HTSE. Moreover, the use of the Database will also expose
which countries are not actively prosecuting traffickers. Ideally, this
159. HUMAN TRAFFICKING, THIS IS A PROJECT OF SOC 266 GLOBAL CHANGE, The U.N.
Thematic
Debates
on
Human
Trafficking
(Nov.
28,
2012),
http://mkhatdija.wordpress.com/2012/11/28/httpwww.unorggapresident62lettersh
traffickingsummary280708-pdf/ (discussing the lack of a universal definition of
HTSE in practice).
160. Supra Part II.
161. See UNTOC, supra note 90, at art. 18 (details the requirement for mutual legal
assistance under UNTOC).
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evidence will allow political pressure to build up both inside and outside
these countries to force those governments to make combating HTSE a
priority. Countries will have an incentive to gather this evidence so they are
able to monitor the progress of their own programs. While it may seem
natural that countries would already have such a system in place, not all do.
By putting the information of the nationality of the traffickers, where
they are found, and including as traffickers anyone who purchases services
from a trafficked person online, patterns of the illegal sex tourism industry
will emerge, enabling governments and organizations to organize to
counteract it. Requiring countries to find, collect, analyze, and send this
information to a central Database will help countries with their own
prosecution and prevention efforts. Such information is necessary to
effectively prosecute those purposefully involved HTSE. This information
is required to formulate the best enforcement and coordination strategies
among law enforcement agencies.162
The Database will also allow other State Parties, NGOs, and
international entities to track the progress of the implementation of the
Palermo Protocol. The number of convictions, sentences, and the
supporting case law will also be accessible on the Internet. When this data
is then compared to reports, such as the Trafficking in Persons report
issued by the U.S. Department of State, the world will know who is
successfully (or at the least attempting) to combat HTSE and who is not.
For the countries that need more resources, this tracking should help
indicate exactly where the fundraising dollars should go. At the same time,
it will aid provide international and local political pressure to do even
more.

4.

Creating a Usable Body of Case Law

The Database will serve as a tool for judges, prosecutors and
lawmakers to avoid problems such as in Canada where HTSE is an official
crime but Crown prosecutors cannot find sentencing references to
prosecute the case.163 Once other nations begin depositing their applicable
court records into the Database, it will provide references for sentences and
the charges to fit the different crimes that make up HTSE.

5.

Exposing the Various Participants in HTSE

The last main purpose of the Database is to expose the various players
in the HTSE scheme. There is a diverse group of actors in HTSE: those that
operate illegally, those whose business are themselves legal, and those who

162. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, The Crime of Human
Trafficking: A Law Enforcement Guide to Identification and Investigation,
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/completehtguide/completehtguide.pdf
(finding that “victim identification can be one of the most challenging tasks for
law enforcement”).
163. See PERRIN, supra note 40, at 121 (referencing problems encountered in Canada
once HTSE crimes were incorporated into the criminal system).
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fall somewhere in between. Many of these actors operate anonymously
and are insulated from facing consequences for their actions. One of the
main impacts the Database will have is the removal of the veil of
anonymity from these actors. It will help make those who buy and use sex
slaves accountable just as those who kidnap them and pimp them on the
streets. This will eat away at the demand for sex trafficking, which is key
towards successfully reducing the profitability and existence of
trafficking.165
In these five ways, the Database will keep the promise the signatures to
the Palermo Protocol made when they created it in 2000. The purpose of
the Palermo Protocol as stated in the Supplementary Protocol is:
(a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular
attention to women and children; (b) To protect and assist the victims of
such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights; and (c) To
promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those
objectives.166
With the aid of the Database, this purpose can finally be fulfilled.

C.

The Function of the Database

The Database will function similar to sex offender registries in the
United States. These registries “contain the names, addresses, and
photographs of sex offenders” and are “easily accessible on the Internet.”167
“A sex offender is anyone who is convicted of a sex crime;”168 however,
crimes that “qualify as a sex crime vary by state.”169 This type of cataloging
parallels the people to be included in the Database—they will all be
convicted of HTSE or associated offenses, but what actions qualify as a
HTSE or an associated offense will depend on each individual country’s
definitions and evidence requirements. However, the goal is to standardize
these definitions and evidence requirements in order to increase the
efficiency of investigation and prosecution of HTSE incidents. For this
goal to be accomplished the Database must be as easily accessible as sex
offender registries generally are in the United States.

164. See SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 84 (“The commitment to trafficking as an activity
differs between commercial actors.”).
165. See WORKING GROUP ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, Proposed Areas of Future
Work
(Oct.
10-12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/2011_CTOC_COP_
WG4/2011_CTOC_COP_WG4_6/CTOC_COP_WG4_2011_6_E.pdf
(mentioning how “demand reduction through awareness-raising and
criminalization of demand is a topic for discussion).
166. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 2.
167. Amanda Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. &
ECON. 207, 207 (2011).
168. Id. at 210.
169. Id.
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The core of the average American sex offender registry, which will be
part of the Database, is the address of the offender. Part of a sex offender
registry’s purpose in the U.S. is to notify the public where these individuals
live so the community is informed and local law enforcement can keep an
eye on them.170 This purpose mirrors the Database as the specific location
of the human trafficker is essential to discover not only the nationality and
identity of the trafficker, but where he is conducting HTSE. While a
trafficker can still change locations, being able to pinpoint even a general
location of trafficking activities will help law enforcement, policy makers,
and legislatures better tailor their actions to the nature and scope of the
problem.
In addition to similar functions, both instruments also have similar
goals in that both try to prevent these crimes from being re-committed
through lowering the probability of recidivism through increased
monitoring. Both the Database and sex offender registries can reduce
recidivism through making law enforcement aware of offenders and their
backgrounds.171 They also raise public awareness, which can “increase the
cost of finding a victim and thus cause offenders to change their
behavior.”172 Both of these tools operate to destroy the anonymity of those
that facilitate these crimes, which should prevent the reoccurrence of these
crimes by both current and future offenders.

D.
1.

Going Beyond the Deficiencies in the Palermo Protocol
Diminishing the Demand for Human Trafficking for Sexual
Exploitation

A problem not sufficiently addressed by the current international
framework to combat HTSE is the demand for HTSE. This is an issue that
the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons recently addressed.173 Both
the Palermo Protocol and national legislation do not adequately focus on
what is fueling the demand for HTSE, which hinders prevention efforts.174
HTSE is fueled by the demand for compliant and affordable sex
purchased by clients who rarely think about the people whose services they
buy.175 The anonymity of the buyers and sellers in sex trafficking makes it
170. Id. at 211-12.
171. Id. (stating that these registries help to increase police monitoring of sex
offenders).
172. Id. at 212.
173. See WORKING GROUP ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 155, (mentioning
how “demand reduction through awareness-raising and criminalization of
demand” is an issue that must be addressed in the future).
174. Id.
175. See SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing how “demand fuels the growth of
human trafficking.” and comparing men who purchase women for sex to people
who accept human trafficking in other professions such as clothing manufacturing
and domestic servants).
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all too easy to ignore whether the women and children being purchased are
in the business consensually.176 According to a Finnish study, “the Internet
[in particular] makes it eas[y] for the customers to remain anonymous; they
do not have to go and look for women on the street . . . they just make a
telephone call for an appointment.”177 Ending this anonymity is key to
reducing the demand for sex slaves. This is what the Database seeks to do.
In a survey done by the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation,
87% of the men surveyed said “that seeing their photo or name appear in a
local paper would serve as a deterrent from buying sex.”178 Putting the
personally identifiable information of the persons engaging in HTSE easily
accessible online should deter many of those who seek to exploit human
beings for their own selfish desires.

2.

Ending Impunity: Those Who Exploit Without Consequence

One of the crucial effects of the Database is the facilitation of
increased prosecution and conviction of traffickers. This increased
enforcement will be accomplished through:
·being a resource for sentencing;
·making convictions (and therefore the implementation of parts of
UNTOC) transparent; and
·providing an avenue to “name and shame” all of the actors involved in
HTSE by publically reporting on those who fall short of their obligations
under the Palermo Protocol.
The Database provides an avenue for all of those who participate in
HTSE to be listed as international criminals without regard to their level of
participation. By implementing this Database, all of those who facilitate
HTSE, particularly the legal and semi-legal actors, will be identified as
people who participate in HTSE. Including these individuals will end the
impunity enjoyed by these actors because although they have not faced
prosecution before, their convictions are crucial to diminishing the
prevalence of HTSE.179

3.

Increasing Deterrence

The Database will also promote both specific and general deterrence.
Specific deterrence is when a person is individually convinced to not take a
176. See PERRIN, supra note 40, at 71-77 (comparing various internet resources and
telephone services where people can purchase sex remotely).
177. JOKINEN, supra note 71, at 87-88.
178. Alizah Salario, U.S. Anti-Sex Trade Aims New Legal Focus on Men Who Buy Sex,
WENEWS (Apr. 18, 2011), http://m.trust.org/trustlaw/news/us-anti-sex-trade-aimsnew-legal-focus-on-men-who-buy-sex/.
179. Yuko Narushima, Diplomatic Impunity: Trafficking Women to the United States,
THE
WASHINGTON
SPECTATOR
(Mar.
1,
2013),
http://www.washingtonspectator.org/index.php/Human-Trafficking/diplomaticimpunity-trafficking-women-to-foreign-embassies-in-us.html (discussing how
members of foreign diplomatic corps who help traffic persons have enjoyed
impunity until now).
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certain course of action. The Database will promote specific deterrence
by “naming and shaming,” both traffickers and sex buyers by putting their
personal information online, which should deter them from continuing to
engage in HTSE. This easily accessible information may deter these people
from ever participating in the sexual slave trade again.
This deterrent will be especially effective for the sex buyers or the
clients who purchase sexual favors from the people trafficked. These
people are generally indirect participants in HTSE.181 Sex buyers “have had
a fairly invisible role” in both prostitution and HTSE efforts as authorities
generally focus “their efforts on controlling the women . . . and leave their
customers out of the picture.”182 Since the Internet has helped sex buyers
remain anonymous and hide their activities, deterring them will require
using the Internet against them.183
There is data that identifies the Internet as a successful way to deter
sex buyers. A study by the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation
shows that “that seeing [the sex buyers’] photo or name appear in a local
paper would serve as a deterrent from buying sex.”184 In this study, sex
buyers were questioned about what would deter them from purchasing
sex.185 Overwhelmingly, the possibilities these individuals admitted would
have the greatest deterrent effect were options that would publicize their
choice to purchase sex.186 Each person listed in the Database will be
specifically deterred from ever becoming involved in HTSE again.
General deterrence involves convincing the greater populace to refrain
from participating in a particular activity.187 General deterrence is achieved
through the Database by making individual traffickers known and easier to
track, which will require organizations to constantly recruit new individuals
180. EUROPEAN ROAD SAFETY OBSERVATORY, General Deterrence vs. Specific
Deterrence
(2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/wcm/road_safety/erso/knowledge/Content/21_speed
_enforcement/general_deterrence_vs_specific_deterrence.htm (providing a brief
summary of general and specific deterrence).
181. SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 39 (Sex buyers “rarely think about the prostitutes with
whom they have sexual relations.”).
182. JOKINEN, supra note 71, at 86.
183. Id. at 85-86 (discussing how the internet is used by those involved in the sex trade
to stay anonymous).
184. Salario, supra note 169.
185. Rachel Durchlag & Samir Goswami, Deconstructing the Demand for
Prostitution: Preliminary Insights From Interviews With Chicago Men Who
Purchase Sex, CHICAGO ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION (2008),
http://www.slaverynomore.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Deconstructing-theDemand-for-Prostitution.pdf (examining the effect of deterrence in sex trafficking
by publicizing a sex buyer’s choice to purchase sex through posting his photo and
name in a local paper, on a billboard, or on the Internet).
186. Id.
187. See EUROPEAN ROAD SAFETY OBSERVATORY, supra note 172 (providing a brief
summary of general and specific deterrence).
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into the business. This should force the cost of HTSE as a business model
to skyrocket. This higher overhead should decrease the profitability of
HTSE. Once this practice is no longer lucrative, there will far less incentive
for any person to engage in it.188
Additionally, this Database will also make clear which Parties are not
implementing the Palermo Protocol by not imposing sufficiently serious
sentences for convicted traffickers. This should provide incentives for the
Parties to assign serious sentences to offenders. As more traffickers are
convicted and sentenced to significant prison terms, people who would
otherwise be involved in HTSE will be deterred from doing so.189
Through diminishing demand, ending impunity, and promoting
deterrence, the Database will attack the organized criminal enterprises
engaged in HTSE from new directions while strengthening the institutions
already in place. Together, this multi-pronged attack will quickly diminish
the prevalence of HTSE and set up the institutional framework to keep it
from flourishing ever again.

F.

The Negative Consequences of the Database
1.

Ruining the Innocent

Despite all the advantages of the Database, there are several potential
negative consequences. For one thing, it has the ability to destroy the lives
of those unjustly charged with HTSE offenses, and attaches stigma to a
person’s name long after he has served his sentence.190 Similar the sex
offender registries in the U.S., the Database will make life more difficult
for those listed. Some of the critics of sex offender registries in the U.S.
argue that the registries do not deter sex offenders, but they do “lower
property values near offenders,” promote vigilante justice and harassment
of offenders, and isolate offenders from society to such an extent that
188. Alexis Aronowitz, Gerda Theuermann & Elena Tyurykanova, Analysing the
Business Model of Trafficking in Human Beings to Better Prevent the Crime,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND CO-ORDINATOR FOR COMBATING
TRAFFICKING
IN
HUMAN
BEINGS,
29-30
(2010),
http://www.osce.org/cthb/69028?download=true (stating how “trafficking
organizations operate as businesses, with the objective of reducing overhead costs
while increasing profits” and as long as trafficking “continues to be profitable
[there will be incentive to] continue involvement in these activities.”).
189. Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity
of Punishment, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1, 2 (Nov. 2010),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf
(discussing how the severity of punishment, i.e. increased prison sentences, may
influence behavior of potential offenders if they weigh the consequences of their
actions and conclude that the risks of punishment are too severe).
190. CONSTITUTIONALFIGHTS.WORDPRESS.COM, How Sex Offender Registries Ruin the
Lives
of
Teenagers
(May
20,
2010),
http://constitutionalfights.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/how-sex-offenderregistries-ruin-the-lives-of-teenagers/ (discussing how the stigma attached to
being a part of a sex offender registry can add punishment that does not fit the
crime).
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reintegration is impossible. These consequences of being listed in the
Database would be particularly egregious if the persons listed were
innocent. Many countries, especially those in the developing world, do not
have judicial systems that render fair judgments. The questionable
determinations by these judicial systems could both undermine the
Database and ruin the lives of individuals falsely accused of engaging in
HTSE.192

2.

Lacking in Support For Victims

With a focus on transparency and increased prosecutions, the Database
provides no direct relief or services to the victims of HTSE. The Database
does not provide an incentive for countries to provide victims with
increased services.

3.

Providing Perverse Incentives For Increased Transparency

The Database will provide both international and domestic pressure for
governments to combat HTSE and publically record their efforts. This
pressure may create perverse incentives. Governments will have an
incentive to look as though their HTSE prosecution and prevention efforts
are successful in order to win political prestige, receive more foreign aid, or
other benefits. With these valuable temptations, some governments may
find distorting the data they submit to the Database to be cheaper and easier
than actually combating HTSE. One of the main avenues they could use to
achieve false successes in combating HTSE is to narrow the definition of
trafficking or sexual slavery, in order to make it look like their country has
less of a problem than it does. Alternatively, a legislature could expand
definitions to include other common crimes to make it look as though they
have increased prosecutions.
Examining Canada’s definition of human trafficking illuminates this
possibility. Recall that Canada’s definition of human trafficking is far
narrower than the U.N. definition,193 with the result that many of incidents
that the U.N. would qualify as human trafficking do not qualify as such in
Canadian jurisdictions. For example, the Canadian definition of HTSE does
not deal with those exploited through coercion, as it only addresses those

191. Agan, supra note 157, at 207, 211-13.
192. See Karin Brulliard, Palestinian Anti-Corruption Court Secures Conviction but
Raises
Questions
of
Bias,
WASH.
POST
(Jun.
20,
2012)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/palestinian-anti-corruption-court-securesconviction-but-raises-questions-of-bias/2012/06/20/gJQAySXjpV_story_1.html
(discussing how the mistrust of courts creates doubt as to the validity of the
judgment handed down).
193. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 137 (discussing the gaps in Canada’s human trafficking
laws); see also supra p. 12.
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who use force or the threat of force.194 This analysis does not encompass
the psychological hold that pimps often hold over those they exploit.195
Another way records of HTSE prosecutions could be distorted is the
existence of plea-bargaining in countries where prostitution is illegal. In
countries where prostitution is not legal, there is the threat of pleabargaining corrupting the integrity of the data contributed to the Database.
For example, if someone is charged with trafficking, that charge could be
plea-bargained down to prostitution by the prosecutor. This bargaining
would skew the reported data, which would create complications in
forming successful strategies to combat HTSE. Countries that have
legalized prostitution such as Germany and the Netherlands will not have
this plea bargaining problem.196

E. The Mediums for Destroying the Effectiveness of the Database
1.

Corruption

Corruption exists everywhere but is particularly prevalent in
developing countries, due to the high rates of poverty and
unemployment.197 Developing countries are among the primary sources of
HTSE.198 Corruption “at all levels, from the police officer to the judge”
makes prosecuting traffickers difficult;199 often law enforcement will either
be paid off to turn a blind eye toward certain HTSE incidents or else will
release arrested traffickers will prematurely.200 The authorities “may use
the prostitution services themselves or the criminals try to bargain with
authorities and offer ‘compensation’ for their cooperation.”201 In fact, much
HTSE activity could not function “without the complicity of law
194. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 423 (Can.).
195. J. Patrick Coolican, The Psychology of Pimping, and How a Community Can
Help,
LAS
VEGAS
SUN
(Apr.
21,
2012),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/apr/21/psychology-pimping-and-whatcommunity-can-do/ (reviewing some of the avenues pimps use to manipulate the
people they exploit).
196. PROCON.ORG, 100 Countries and Their Prostitution Policies (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772 (providing a
summary of the legal status of prostitution in 100 countries).
197. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Oct. 26, 2013)
(providing a summary of corruption by country).
198. Rita Chi-Ying Chung, Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: Psychological
& Cultural Impacts, 2 GEO. MASON GLOBAL STUDIES REVIEW (2006), available at
http://www.globality-gmu.net/archives/960 (“[T]rafficking usually moves people
from less developed countries into developed and industrialized countries.”).
199. Jullien, supra note 64, at 584.
200. See HUMANTRAFFICKING.ORG, supra note 106 (discussing allegations of “law
enforcement and government officials are believed to have accepted bribes to
facilitate the trafficking and sex trade. There are reports of government officials
who are complicit in the trafficking by accepting bribes.”).
201. JOKINEN, supra note 71, at 84.
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enforcement and the corruption of officials in source, transit, and
destination countries.”202 An infamous example of law enforcement
complicity is the NATO-led military peacekeepers who trafficked Bosnian
women in the aftermath of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.203 While the
peacekeepers were in the former Yugoslavia to aid in the transition at the
end of the war, they also raped and trafficked women for their own
benefit.204 The Database will unlikely have any significant impact on
corruption and in fact corruption may frustrate the purposes of the
Database by being an obstacle to the successful prosecution of traffickers
and data collection on HTSE.
2.

Cultural Bias

Another potential shortcoming of the Database is that it will also likely
have very little effect on the cultural biases that perpetuate HTSE. Recall
that the cultural “views of women as less valuable . . . have produced a
more tolerant view of prostitution and sexual violence” against women in
some areas of the world.205 Aside from the traditional prejudice against the
victims of sexual exploitation,206 in some countries and cultures there are
social pressures that facilitate the perpetuation of HTSE. The International
Organization for Migration collected survey data that showed that “a
client’s first experience with a prostitute was more likely to have been
arranged by friends . . . than the result of an independent decision.”207 For
the majority of men surveyed, “the initial decision to buy sex” was a
“public and social matter.”208 Some of the men studied, particularly those
from Thailand, discussed how “buying sex can be part of a ‘rite of
passage,’ as well as a ritual to consolidate relationships with male
friends.”209 Such cultural exercises perpetuate HTSE and will likely be
unaffected by the institution of the Database.
202. Id.
203. Martina Vandenberg, Complicity, Corruption, and Human Rights: Trafficking in
Human Beings, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 323, 326 (2002) (discussing the
involvement of U.S. civilian contractors in trafficking related activities).
204. Neil MacFarquhar, Peacekeepers’ Sex Scandals Linger, On Screen and Off, N. Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
7,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/world/08nations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=
0 (“Those girls are whores of war,” growls the male bureaucrat heading the
United Nations mission. “It happens; I will not dictate for morality.”).
205. Maciel-Matos, supra note 6, at 337.
206. HUMANTRAFFICKING.ORG,
Reintegration,
http://www.humantrafficking.org/combat_trafficking/reintegration (last visited
Oct. 25, 2013) (discussing the obstacles, including stigma, of reintegrating
trafficking victims into their home communities).
207. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, Is Trafficking in Human Beings
Demand Driven? A Multi-Country Pilot Study, IOM MIGRATION RESEARCH
SERIES 17 (2003).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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Corruption and cultural bias could limit the Database’s effectiveness in
some countries. But these obstacles are well known, and the benefits of the
Database for most countries far outweigh the possible negative impact that
these forces could have on others. The Database will be an effective tool to
implement the true purpose of the Palermo Protocol: to unite the world in a
common cause, the end of HTSE.

CONCLUSION
When the U.N. developed UNTOC and its supplementing protocols, it
did not go far enough as inherent weaknesses within these treaties, likely a
result of political posturing, created an international framework without an
enforcement mechanism. As a consequence, HTSE still exists and
flourishes.
Though the creation of the Offenders of Humanity Database cannot
end HTSE on its own, it can steer efforts in the right direction by providing
an accessible tool for use by national and international law enforcement
agencies. The Database can provide sentencing guidelines, a way to make
the implementation of the Palermo Protocol transparent and available, and
destroy the anonymity of those who profit from HTSE. The Database will
also help prevent cultural attitudes from being an obstacle to the
elimination of HTSE by making the issue more transparent. This process
should add political pressure to keep politicians from breaking their
promises- promises they made by signing these treaties.
The world can come together again and finish what it started:
diminishing HTSE to the extent that it only exists as a dark chapter in the
history of the human race, instead of as an ever-present travesty. But for
this to happen, the veil of secrecy under which human traffickers operate
and flourish must be lifted. Once enemies are visible, they are far easier to
defeat.

237

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014
Nowhere to Hide

238

